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Commander in Chief Lincoln
Only in part because 2009 is the bicentennial of his birth, the hunger for
books about Abraham Lincoln shows no sign of slowing down with the rest of
book publishing during the current deep recession. Indeed one might surmise
that the precipitous downturn stimulates the demand to read about the grandest
American hero saving the nation from its greatest crisis. Recently, in Team of
Rivals (2005), Doris Kearns Goodwin has proclaimed Lincoln’s superhumanity
right in the subtitle of her book, The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln. This
book is said to have influenced Barack Obama about taking his erstwhile rival
Hillary Clinton as the head officer of his cabinet a la Lincoln and Seward.
Several other recent books have analyzed Lincoln as orator and writer, two at
least focusing on the Second Inaugural Address, the shortest in American
history. Three recent books examine the friendship of Lincoln and Frederick
Douglass, who met each other three times. It would be a full time scholarly
occupation to keep up with the seemingly inexhaustible mantras of Lincolnalia.
Of the recent flood of books, perhaps the most original is Joshua Wolf
Shenk’s Lincoln’s Melancholy (2005), a study of the effects of the deep
depression in which Lincoln lived almost all the time, a condition Lincoln
himself acknowledged but which few historians have fully factored into their
reckoning of his personality. However, even the subtitle of Shenk’s subtle and
rich study demonstrates the adulatory nature of this entire genre: How
Depression Challenged a President and Fueled His Greatness. Except for a
bitter and marginal squad of neo-Confederates, nearly every Lincoln book is
elegiac to the point of worshipfulness. Myth and man are fully united; critical
analysis is subordinated to celebration.
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Tried by War, written by the best-selling James McPherson with his
customary clarity of prose, depth of detail, and force of narrative, is yet another
full-bore contribution to this flood of hero-worship. Depicting Lincoln as
national savior right on his dust jacket, McPherson (or the copy writer whose
prose he approved), tells us that Lincoln invented the idea of
commander-in-chief, and that he stepped beyond the narrow constitutional
definition of the presidency and that this was a “good thing too, because his
strategic insight and will to fight changed the course of history and saved the
Union."
What follows inside the book will be familiar to readers of McPherson’s full
studies of the Civil War, Battle Cry of Freedom (1988) and Ordeal by Fire
(1982). Those works contextualized Lincoln’s role, while this tome revises
nothing but abstracts it from its broader surrounds, the better to emphasize
Lincoln’s unique genius. Lincoln read up on military strategy early in the war
and thereafter continually urged his commanders to swifter and more decisive
action, a position that McPherson subscribes to as a great strategic insight.
Although McPherson does not put it this way, in many respects it appears that
Lincoln still believed that one decisive battle would annihilate the enemy and
end the war, the Napoleonic fantasy that propelled many generals into battles of
indecisive slaughter.
As readers of McPherson’s earlier work will recognize, George McClellan
remains the bete noir of his argument. McClellan is of course an easy and
customary target for modern historians: here as elsewhere in the McPherson
oeuvre he serves as the perfect foil, the near-traitorous advocate of limited war
whose slowness to attack proved Lincoln’s vastly superior wisdom.
Ambrose Burnside and Joseph Hooker, the two subsequent generals in the
East, heard Lincoln loud and clear, and at his bequest launched aggressive
attacks leading to massive and enormously demoralizing Union defeats.
McPherson chalks up these catastrophes to poor generalship, ignoring the fact
that in the Civil War those fighting tactically defensive battles rarely lost.
Aggressive assaults deriving from the Napoleonic smoothbore era almost never
won in the new day of the far more effective firepower of the recently evolved
rifle. Pushing his commanders to attack as aggressively as possible was quite
often the recipe for disaster.
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McPherson also repeats several times Lincoln’s oft-stated dictum that the
enemy army and not enemy territory was the chief objective and takes this as
further proof of his strategic genius. Therefore Lincoln opposed both Grant’s
Vicksburg campaign and Sherman’s March to the Sea for risking Union armies
in unorthodox ways and by tactically moving away from enemy armies, and in
the case of Sherman, placing the decimation of civilian material and morale well
ahead of military engagement. As McPherson illustrates, Lincoln was humble
enough to apologize to both generals after they ignored his advice and followed
their own tactical insights.
Although counter-imperial apologies such as this are both rare and attractive
in a commander-in-chief, these cases hardly prove Lincoln’s omniscience. In
addition the Union effort in the west was essentially uncontrolled by
Washington, a major example of the disorganized nature of this war, something
that rarely appears as an important factor in tales of presidential triumph,
including this one. Lincoln’s hand was effectively absent from this theater
almost all of the time.
After Grant took command in the east, Lincoln imposed on him the Red
River campaign in Texas. This was Lincoln’s single major contribution to
military campaign planning, upon which he insisted despite Grant’s belief that it
was at best strategic irrelevancy, and that it would undermine the Union effort to
take Mobile, a far more important objective. Under Nathaniel P. Banks, a
political crony of Lincoln, this campaign was an unmitigated and wasteful
disaster. McPherson doesn’t exactly conclude that this was Lincoln’s mistake,
blaming Banks almost entirely. Because this was the only time that Lincoln was
clearly the strategic author of an idea he imposed on his army, it is a rather
significant countervailing example to the notion of the ever-brilliant commander
in chief.
Of course the Union won the war, and so it is easy enough to select those
elements where the Union prevailed and lay them end-to-end as markers on the
road to ultimate victory. But it was less the stunning victories and more the
cumulative effect of the Union war effort that finally exhausted the southern will
and ability to resist. The less disorganized and less impoverished side won over
the long run, at enormous human and material costs, rather than in some
inevitably unfolding military triumph. A less heroic and personalized version of
the Civil War would be more accurate if less inspiring.
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We know that Lincoln made far more modest claims on his supposed
genius. It was of course he who drew the insightful conclusion, as he wrote a
supporter, “I claim not to have controlled events but confess plainly that events
have controlled me."
Lincoln was thinking of the limits of his political as well as his military
leadership when he wrote this insightful letter. But as is usual with the Lincoln
genre, Lincoln appears in this volume as the bestriding genius of both realms.
The conventional version mistakes Lincoln’s undoubted steadfastness and
impressive sense of timing with sole effective authorship of northern political
strategy.
During the first year of the war an ever-increasing flood of the enslaved
liberated themselves and moved toward Union bases, creating huge numbers of
antislavery facts on the ground. At the same time abolitionists as well as
congressional radicals pushed relentlessly for emancipation. Lincoln, ever-open
to the radicals, moved in their direction. He increasingly shared the compelling
nature of their logic that only an antislavery war rather than a war merely for
reunion would resolve the fundamental issue that had led to the Confederate
revolt.
Here black self-emancipation is ignored and the role of the Radicals is
barely mentioned, except as a wrong-headed drag on Lincoln’s careful and
ever-correct strategizing. The fundamental political dynamic that pushed the war
toward emancipation was constructed by forces to the left of Lincoln pushing
him to greater political action, forces of which he was perfectly aware and that
he increasingly welcomed.
Why has this image of an essentially controlling, ever-unfolding genius
triumphed over a more realistic and struggling version of Lincoln? Why does
belief in the mythic savior displace contradiction and complexity, making the
assertion that Lincoln was a genius suffice as the thesis of endless numbers of
books? Such triumphalist special pleading tends to be dehumanizing and in
many ways undynamic and ahistorical. But clearly it is urgently desired.
During these dark national times, marked by corruption and reaction among
the dominant elements of the society, there is a deep need for simpler stories of
heroic times and heroic figures. Indeed one can already sense that Barack
Obama, another man from Illinois, is being constructed as a second Lincoln and
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FDR, with George Bush as Buchanan/Hoover. Not insignificantly, the
extra-constitutional actions of Bush might give one pause about unequivocally
celebrating Lincoln’s violations of civil liberties. Perhaps they helped save the
Union, but used unwisely they can also destroy freedom and induce widespread
fear.
In the realm of myth, the construction of an African-American second
Lincoln appears as the fulfillment of the emancipation achieved by the Civil
War. Beyond that, Americans, almost perpetually at war, want to believe that
war can achieve unquestionably moral ends, and that they are worth fighting
under the right leadership and for the right goals. Lincoln as the apotheosis of the
just leader of the just war remains politically essential as the noblest warrior.
The Copperheads, alongside George McClellan, provide the perfect
antithesis to the Lincoln legend. As white supremacists, they opposed abolition,
and after the war they supported the destruction of Reconstruction that their
southern confreres accomplished through organized political terrorism, creating
the apartheid solution to race relations that defined the United States until very
recently. Much of the thrust of emancipation was reversed after the war, which
makes the Civil War less triumphal when viewed from the vantage point of the
society and the values that followed for most of a century. This reaction means
that Lincoln was not the all-sufficient culminating figure of American history
that Lincoln scholars, and perhaps most American want him to be. History is
ever complex, ever dark, something Lincoln well understood, as does Barack
Obama.
The Civil War is a definitive national victory only if one ignores or
considers as secondary the bloodshed and social injustices that color so much of
American history at home as well as abroad. The current stakes in the sainted
Lincoln legend remain considerable, as we see here from the pen of one of its
most skillful practitioners. As a solution it is a problem.
Michael Fellman is Professor of History Emeritus at Simon Fraser
University, and author of In the Name of God and Country: Reconsidering
Terrorism in American History, forthcoming from Yale University Press.
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